

United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
James R. TURCOTTE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 03-2988.

Argued Nov. 1, 2004.
Decided April 19, 2005.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied June 14, 2005.

Background: Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, [James B. Moran](#), J., of possession and distribution of a controlled substance analogue, and defendant appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, [Cudahy](#), Circuit Judge, held that:

- (1) as a matter of first impression, ambiguous definition of “controlled substance analogue” in Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act is to be read conjunctively;
- (2) district court's error in giving disjunctive jury instruction concerning definition of “controlled substance analogue” did not prejudice defendant;
- (3) to be convicted of possessing with intent to distribute mixtures containing a controlled substance, it must be shown that the defendant knew that the substance at issue had a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must either have known that it had similar physiological effects or intended or represented that it had such effects;
- (4) prosecution's delay in disclosing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigational new drug applications (IND) did not violate defendant's rights under *Brady*;
- (5) analogue provision of the controlled substance act was not unconstitutionally vague; and
- (6) rule of lenity was not applicable.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes

[1] Controlled Substances 96H ⚡9

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HI](#) In General

[96Hk9](#) k. Substances regulated; definitions and schedules. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Ambiguous definition of “controlled substance analogue” in Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act is to be read conjunctively, i.e. substance in order to be “analogue” is required to satisfy both chemical structure prong of statutory definition and either have a substantially similar effect on the central nervous system or be purported or intended to have such an effect. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32)(A), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)\(A\)](#).

[2] Criminal Law 110 ⚡1172.1(3)

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXIV](#) Review

[110XXIV\(Q\)](#) Harmless and Reversible Error

[110k1172](#) Instructions

[110k1172.1](#) In General

[110k1172.1\(2\)](#) Particular Instructions

[110k1172.1\(3\)](#) k. Elements and incidents of offense; definitions. [Most Cited Cases](#)

District court's error in giving disjunctive jury instruction concerning definition of “controlled substance analogue” in Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act, rather than conjunctive instruction, which would have required prosecution to prove both a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance and that the substance

either have a substantially similar effect on the central nervous system or be purported or intended to have such an effect, did not prejudice defendant, and thus was not reversible error, where defendant's sentence was based purely on his possession and distribution of gamma butyrolacetone (GBL), which was found to satisfy all three clauses of the act. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102, [21 U.S.C.A. § 802](#).

[3] Criminal Law 110 **1139**

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXIV](#) Review

[110XXIV\(L\)](#) Scope of Review in General

[110XXIV\(L\)13](#) Review De Novo

[110k1139](#) k. In general. [Most Cited Cases](#)

An appellate court reviews de novo a district court's denial of a requested jury instruction.

[4] Controlled Substances 96H **31**

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HII](#) Offenses

[96Hk31](#) k. Possession for sale or distribution. [Most Cited Cases](#)

In the context of the analogue provision, to be convicted of possessing with intent to distribute mixtures containing a controlled substance, it must be shown that the defendant knew that the substance at issue had a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must either have known that it had similar physiological effects or intended or represented that it had such effects. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 102(32), 401(a), [21 U.S.C.A. §§ 802\(32\), 841\(a\)](#).

[5] Criminal Law 110 **1172.1(3)**

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXIV](#) Review

[110XXIV\(Q\)](#) Harmless and Reversible Error

[110k1172](#) Instructions

[110k1172.1](#) In General

[110k1172.1\(2\)](#) Particular Instructions

[110k1172.1\(3\)](#) k. Elements and incidents of offense; definitions. [Most Cited Cases](#)

District court's error, in instructing jury as to prerequisites for liability under the controlled substances analogue provision, that defendant could be convicted for possessing with intent to distribute mixtures containing a controlled substance whether or not defendant knew that the substance in question, specifically, GBL (gamma butyrolacetone) was an illegal analogue, was harmless, given that Congress had specifically declared that GBL was a controlled substance analogue, putting a drug merchant on notice of its illegality, and that defendant acknowledged that he knew he was selling substances containing GBL. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 102(32), 401(a), [21 U.S.C.A. §§ 802\(32\), 841\(a\)](#).

[6] Criminal Law 110 **1992**

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXXI](#) Counsel

[110XXXI\(D\)](#) Duties and Obligations of Prosecuting Attorneys

[110XXXI\(D\)2](#) Disclosure of Information

[110k1992](#) k. Materiality and probable effect of information in general. [Most Cited Cases](#)

(Formerly 110k700(2.1))

[Brady](#) instructs that the prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose all information that is (1) in the government's possession, (2) material and (3) exculpatory.

[7] Criminal Law 110 **1992**

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXXI](#) Counsel

[110XXXI\(D\)](#) Duties and Obligations of Prosecuting Attorneys

[110XXXI\(D\)2](#) Disclosure of Information

[110k1992](#) k. Materiality and probable effect of information in general. [Most Cited Cases](#)

(Formerly 110k700(2.1))

For purposes of a [Brady](#) claim, any evidence whose suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial is considered material.

[8] Criminal Law 110 1152.19(5)

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXIV](#) Review

[110XXIV\(N\)](#) Discretion of Lower Court

[110k1152](#) Conduct of Trial in General

[110k1152.19](#) Counsel

[110k1152.19\(5\)](#) k. Duties and obligations of prosecuting attorneys. [Most Cited Cases](#)

(Formerly 110k1154)

Criminal Law 110 2008

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXXI](#) Counsel

[110XXXI\(D\)](#) Duties and Obligations of Prosecuting Attorneys

[110XXXI\(D\)2](#) Disclosure of Information

[110k2008](#) k. Sanctions for failure to disclose. [Most Cited Cases](#)

(Formerly 110k700(2.1))

District courts have broad discretion in determining [Brady](#) violations, and so an appellate court reviews the decision below only for abuse of discretion.

[9] Criminal Law 110 2007

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXXI](#) Counsel

[110XXXI\(D\)](#) Duties and Obligations of Prosecuting Attorneys

[110XXXI\(D\)2](#) Disclosure of Information

[110k2007](#) k. Time and manner of required disclosure. [Most Cited Cases](#)

(Formerly 110k700(5))

Prosecution's delay in disclosing Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigational new drug applications (IND), which detailed research into potential medical uses for GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid) to treat narcolepsy, in prosecution for possession and distribution of a controlled substance analogue, did not violate defendant's rights under [Brady](#); although the INDs were disclosed somewhat late in the prosecution, the INDs did not change the fact that GHB was a Schedule I controlled substance at the time of defendant's alleged conduct and although GHB may have been approved for another use as a component of some other drug, that fact did not alter the fundamental basis of defendant's liability. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

[10] Criminal Law 110 1139

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XXIV](#) Review

[110XXIV\(L\)](#) Scope of Review in General

[110XXIV\(L\)13](#) Review De Novo

[110k1139](#) k. In general. [Most Cited Cases](#)

An appellate court reviews de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute.

[11] Controlled Substances 96H 6

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HI](#) In General

[96Hk4](#) Statutes and Other Regulations

[96Hk6](#) k. Validity. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Analogue provision of the controlled substance act was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to GBL (gamma butyrolactone) as an analogue of GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid), a Schedule I controlled substance under federal regulations. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

[\[12\]](#) Controlled Substances [96H](#) 9

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HI](#) In General

[96Hk9](#) k. Substances regulated; definitions and schedules. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act (DSHEA) did not preclude the regulation of GBL (gamma butyrolactone) as an analogue of GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid). Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 201, [21 U.S.C.A. § 321](#); Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention Control Act of 1970, §§ 102(32)(A), 203, 401(a)(1), as amended, [21 U.S.C.A. §§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), [813](#), [841\(a\)\(1\)](#).

[\[13\]](#) Controlled Substances [96H](#) 9

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HI](#) In General

[96Hk9](#) k. Substances regulated; definitions and schedules. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Rule of lenity was not applicable to analogue provision of the controlled substances act (CSA) concerning the regulation of GBL (gamma butyrolactone) and BD (1,4-butanediol); as per both the CSA itself and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulation, GBL was not exempt from regulation under the CSA as a controlled substance analogue. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102, [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

[\[14\]](#) Controlled Substances [96H](#) 9

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HI](#) In General

[96Hk9](#) k. Substances regulated; definitions and schedules. [Most Cited Cases](#)

Even if emergency scheduling of GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid) as a controlled substance expired after one year, GHB was clearly listed as a Schedule I at the time of the conduct leading to defendant's arrest and conviction, supporting defendant's conviction for distribution of gamma butyrolactone (GBL) as an analogue of GHB. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, §§ 102(32), 201(h), [21 U.S.C.A. §§ 802\(32\)](#), [811\(h\)](#).

[\[15\]](#) Controlled Substances [96H](#) 69

[96H](#) Controlled Substances

[96HIII](#) Prosecutions

[96Hk69](#) k. Admissibility of evidence. [Most Cited Cases](#)

In controlled substances analogue prosecution, testimony concerning the health effects of GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid) was directly relevant to second and third clauses of controlled substances analogue provision, which required controlled substance analogues to have similar actual or purported physiological effects to controlled substances; thus consideration of GHB's physiological effects was crucial to the jury's determination that GBL (gamma butyrolactone), in light of its own physiological effects, was an analogue of GHB. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

[\[16\]](#) Criminal Law [110](#) 478(1)

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XVII](#) Evidence

[110XVII\(R\)](#) Opinion Evidence

[110k477](#) Competency of Experts

[110k478](#) Knowledge, Experience, and Skill

[110k478\(1\)](#) k. In general. [Most Cited Cases](#)

In controlled substances analogue prosecution, witnesses were qualified to testify as experts regarding the similarity of the effects of GHB (gamma hydroxybutyric acid), GBL (gamma butyrolactone), and BD (1,4-butanediol), given that both witnesses had advanced scientific degrees, and both had published extensively on the effects of GHB and GBL. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

[\[17\]](#) Criminal Law [110](#) [855\(8\)](#)

[110](#) Criminal Law

[110XX](#) Trial

[110XX\(J\)](#) Issues Relating to Jury Trial

[110k855](#) Misconduct of or Affecting Jurors

[110k855\(8\)](#) k. Communication between jurors and third persons. [Most Cited Cases](#)

In controlled substances analogue prosecution, alleged incident wherein a juror encountered prosecution witness during a court recess and asked witness for a mint did not warrant a mistrial, absent evidence of any wrongdoing or resulting prejudice connected with the encounter. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 102(32), [21 U.S.C.A. § 802\(32\)](#).

*[518](#) Monika Bickert (argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

[Derek J. Sarafa](#) (argued), Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before [CUDAHY](#), [ROVNER](#) and [WOOD](#), Circuit Judges.

[CUDAHY](#), Circuit Judge.

Appellant James Turcotte was convicted of three counts of violating the Controlled Substances Act, including a conviction for possession and distribution of a controlled substance analogue as defined by [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#). Turcotte now appeals his conviction before this Court, alleging that (1) the district court issued at least two erroneous and prejudicial jury instructions relating to the Analogue Provision of the Controlled Substances Act, (2) the prosecution improperly withheld *Brady* material at trial, (3) his conviction was precluded by existing federal law, (4) the Analogue Provision of the Controlled Substances Act is unconstitutionally vague and (5) the district court made several errors in trial management. We now affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In this case we confront Congress's attempt to adapt the nation's controlled substances laws to the dizzying pace of innovations in drug technology. This case also marks the most recent chapter in one man's ill-fated personal and professional odyssey from bricklayer to bodybuilder to drug merchant. James Turcotte worked as a bricklayer throughout most of the 1990s. In late 1998 or early 1999, Turcotte was contacted by Brian Gore and asked to do some construction work at Max Muscle, a store selling vitamins, supplements, sports apparel and weightlifting [*519](#) equipment in a shopping mall in Downers Grove, Illinois. Max Muscle had been recently opened by Gore's friend Scott Wright. In September, 1999, Turcotte participated in a bodybuilding contest sponsored by Max Muscle, which required contestants to use Max Muscle products while preparing for the competition. In conjunction with this competition, Turcotte purchased nutritional supplements from Max Muscle, including "Verve 5.0," a purported vitamin supplement that contains the chemicals GHB, GBL and BD.^{[FNI](#)}

^{[FNI](#)}. "GHB" is Gamma Hydroxybutyric Acid, a Schedule I Controlled Substance under federal regulations. Gamma Butyrolactone ("GBL") and 1,4-butanediol ("BD") are substances that convert to GHB in the human body.

Sometime in March 2000, Gore sold Best Buy Supplements, an internet-based company through which Turcotte was to sell Verve 5.0, to Turcotte. Best Buy Supplements conducted its business through the websites *bestbuysupplements.com* and *growthhormoneshop.com*, offering a variety of bodybuilding and fitness products including Verve 5.0 and other "Growth Hormone Products." The *bestbuysupplements.com* website, which listed Turcotte as its "owner," touted Verve 5.0 as the "absolute finest quality GHB precursor" and acknowledged that both "furanone"-another name for GBL-and "butanediol"

(BD) are “illegal nationwide.” To fulfill customer orders, Turcotte purchased cases of Verve labeled “cleaning supplies.”

In August of 2000, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) began an undercover investigation of Turcotte's sales of Verve after arresting Kevin Masquida, who had purchased Verve online from Best Buy Supplements. Masquida entered into a plea agreement with the government under which he agreed to help the DEA arrange an undercover purchase of Verve from Turcotte. After a series of phone calls from Masquida, the purchase was scheduled for 5:00 p.m. on September 8, 2000, at a Shell gas station in Mokena, Illinois. Masquida agreed to buy twenty cases of Verve for \$10,000.

On the day of the transaction, undercover DEA agent Robert Coleman accompanied Masquida, posing as an individual interested in purchasing Verve. The entire transaction was monitored by DEA surveillance. Turcotte and Gore met Masquida and Coleman at the Shell station as planned, and they drove to a nearby Wendy's parking lot where Turcotte had parked his van. Coleman handed Turcotte a styrofoam cup containing \$10,000 in cash, and Turcotte directed the group to transfer 20 cases of Verve from Turcotte's van to Masquida's van. When the transfer began and Coleman was able to confirm that the cases did contain Verve, DEA agents arrived to arrest Turcotte and Gore.

Turcotte was charged on three counts of a five-count indictment. *Count One* charged Turcotte with knowingly and intentionally conspiring to defraud and mislead the government by introducing misbranded drugs (GHB, GBL and BD) into interstate commerce. *Count Two* charged Turcotte with conspiring to possess and distribute GHB (a Schedule I Controlled Substance), GBL (a Schedule I controlled substance analogue under [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#)), and BD (a Schedule I controlled substance analogue under [§ 802\(32\)](#)) in violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA or “the Act”), [21 U.S.C. §§ 841\(a\)\(1\)](#) and [813](#). *Count Five* charged Turcotte with knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute 60 gallons of GHB and GBL in violation of [§§ 841\(a\)\(1\)](#) and [813](#) of the CSA. As to GBL and BD, these charges come under the Analogue Provision of the ***520** Controlled Substances Act, [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#), which provides that substances satisfying the definition of a “controlled substance analogue” may be regulated as controlled substances even though they are not formally classified as such under federal law.

On November 12, 2000, Turcotte proceeded to trial. Government witnesses included Agent Coleman, Masquida, officials from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a forensic drug chemist from the DEA, toxicology and medical experts, registered distributors of GBL and other law enforcement and fact witnesses who testified about the physiological effects of GBL. During the trial, the government claims it suddenly became aware of Investigational New Drug Reports (INDs) which detailed research into potential medical uses for GHB, including a treatment for [narcolepsy](#) involving a new drug named [Xyrem](#). Turcotte immediately requested copies of the INDs. The district court, while opining that the INDs would probably prove to be of little use to the defense, provided that the government's witnesses would remain available for recall after presentation of the government's case-in-chief so that Turcotte could cross-examine them further about the content of the new INDs. In his defense, Turcotte testified personally and also called his own forensic chemistry and medical experts to testify. Turcotte admitted that he knew Verve was a chemical solvent and that he had sold it for human consumption.

At the conclusion of the trial, the district court issued its instructions to the jury. Two of them are at issue here. First, with regard to the definition of a controlled substance analogue, the district court instructed the jury that the three clauses of the CSA's Analogue Provision, [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#), should be read in the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive. After acknowledging that the Seventh Circuit had not yet endorsed either reading of the provision, the court gave the jury special verdict forms on which they could rule specifically on each of the Analogue Provision's three clauses. The court explained that it would temporarily defer ruling on the proper reading of the Act but would revisit the issue if the special jury forms revealed that the different readings of the provision-conjunctive versus disjunctive-would have produced different results. Second, with regard to Count Five, the district court instructed the jury on the scienter requirement of the CSA's analogue provision, telling jury members they could convict Turcotte even if they did not find that he knew GBL was a “controlled substance.”

On November 22, 2002, the jury convicted Turcotte on all counts, returning special verdict forms finding that GBL met all three criteria listed in the CSA's Analogue Provision, [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#), but that BD met only one of these criteria. On January 22, 2003, Turcotte timely filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial. He claimed that (1) the district court's jury instruction mandating a disjunctive reading of the CSA's Analogue Provision was error, (2) the court's jury instruction regarding the Analogue Provision's scienter requirement was erroneous, (3) the prosecution improperly withheld *Brady* materials (the new INDs) and (4) the Analogue Provision of the CSA is unconstitutionally vague. Turcotte later filed an untimely motion further alleging (1) that GBL and BD are not controlled substance analogues of GHB because GHB is no longer a Schedule I Controlled Substance, and (2) that the Dietary Supplements Health & Education Act (DSHEA) prevents BD and GBL from being classified as controlled substance analogues.

The district court considered all of Turcotte's claims-timely and untimely alike-*521 and denied his post-trial motions for an acquittal or a new trial in a memorandum disposition dated July 7, 2003. [United States v. Turcotte, 286 F.Supp.2d 947 \(N.D.Ill.2003\)](#). Turcotte was sentenced to 54 months' imprisonment for each of the three counts (to run concurrently), three years' supervised release and a fine. Turcotte now appeals the district court's denial of his post-trial motions and asks that his conviction be reversed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded for resentencing.

II. JURISDICTION

Since Turcotte was charged with a violation of the federal Controlled Substances Act ([21 U.S.C. §§ 841\(a\)\(1\)](#) and [846](#)), the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to [18 U.S.C. § 3231](#), which provides for district court jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” The jury returned a guilty verdict against Turcotte on November 22, 2002, and the district court entered judgment on July 22, 2003. Turcotte timely filed his Notice of Appeal on July 23, 2003, and this Court now has jurisdiction to review the final order of the district court pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 1291](#).

III. DISCUSSION

Turcotte advances six distinct claims in his challenge to the district court's ruling below. We address each of these claims in turn.

A. Conjunctive Versus Disjunctive Readings of the CSA's Analogue Provision

The particular constructional issue raised here is one of first impression for this Court. The CSA provides that certain substances, while not officially scheduled as controlled substances themselves, may be regulated as such if they meet the definition of a “controlled substance analogue.” The CSA defines a “controlled substance analogue” as “a substance-”

- (i) the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in schedule I or II;
- (ii) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II; or
- (iii) with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in schedule I or II.

[21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) (2004).

As the old adage instructs, the devil is in the details-the relevant detail here being the single word “or” between clauses (ii) and (iii) of the definition. There are two possible readings of this definition. Under a disjunctive reading, a substance that satisfies *any one* of these three criteria qualifies as a controlled substance analogue. Under a conjunctive reading, the provision requires two things: (1) The substance in question must have a chemical structure substantially similar to a controlled substance (criterion one) *and* (2) it must *either* have a substantially similar effect on the central nervous system (criterion two) *or* be purported or intended to have such an effect (criterion three).

Both parties and the district court agree that the Seventh Circuit has yet to address this particular constructional issue. *See* [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). It is also undisputed*522 that the district court submitted a disjunctive instruction to the jury with the intention of revisiting the issue if the special verdict forms showed that the two interpretations would lead to different results. In its disposition of Turcotte's motion for a post-trial acquittal or a new trial, the district court stated that it was actually “inclined to agree” with Turcotte's arguments for a conjunctive reading of the Act, but that “such a determination ... does not affect defendant's conviction” since “[t]he jury's special verdict forms establish that the government proved all three elements of [Section 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to GHB.” *Id.* On appeal, the parties differ on the correctness of the district court's disjunctive instruction and its effect (or lack thereof) on Mr. Turcotte's conviction and sentencing. Turcotte contends that the district court's instruction was erroneous, and that it did indeed affect his ultimate sentence. This Court reviews *de novo* a district court's denial of a requested jury instruction. [United States v. Slater, 348 F.3d](#)

Unfortunately, the text of the Controlled Substances Act analogue provision is not a model of clarity. Common sense and the practical implications of various interpretive options ultimately offer more guidance than the text and structure of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) itself. As a matter of strict textual analysis, [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) is susceptible to either a disjunctive or a conjunctive reading. The word “which” in the beginning of clauses (ii) and (iii) could be construed to refer either to “substance” in the preface of the definition (favoring a disjunctive reading) or to “chemical structure” in clause (i) (favoring a conjunctive reading). Yet the vast majority of federal courts to confront this issue have adopted the conjunctive reading. [United States v. Hodge](#), 321 F.3d 429, 433 (3d Cir.2003) (presenting in-depth analysis of the plain meaning and legislative history of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#)); [United States v. Klecker](#), 348 F.3d 69, 71 (4th Cir.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); [United States v. Washam](#), 312 F.3d 926, 930 n. 2 (8th Cir.2002) (adopting the conjunctive reading); [United States v. McKinney](#), 79 F.3d 105, 107-08 (8th Cir.1996), *vacated on other grounds*, 520 U.S. 1226, 117 S.Ct. 1816, 137 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997) (presenting the test in the conjunctive without further elaboration); [United States v. Brown](#), 279 F.Supp.2d at 1240 (S.D.Ala.2003) (adopting the conjunctive reading); [United States v. Vickery](#), 199 F.Supp.2d at 1371 (N.D.Ga.2002) (same); [United States v. Clifford](#), 197 F.Supp.2d at 519-20 (E.D.Va.2002) (same); [United States v. Forbes](#), 806 F.Supp. 232, 235 (D.Colo.1992) (reviewing the Act's legislative history and asserting that the conjunctive reading is required to prevent absurd results). *See also* [United States v. Roberts](#), 363 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir.2004) (briefly surveying the relevant precedents and accepting the conjunctive reading). The only arguable exceptions are [United States v. Fisher](#), 289 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), in which the Eleventh Circuit expressly declined to decide the issue, and [United States v. Granberry](#), 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990), in which the Fifth Circuit recited the test in the disjunctive without discussion or elaboration.

[1] The majority of these courts base their rulings largely on the absurd results that might obtain under a disjunctive reading, noting that alcohol and caffeine could be criminalized as controlled substance analogues based solely on the fact that, in concentrated form, they might have depressant or stimulant effects similar to illegal drugs. *See, e.g., Forbes*, 806 F.Supp. at 235. Similarly, the sale of everyday substances could be criminalized if the seller merely represents that they are banned substances or have physiological *523 effects similar to illegal drugs. *See id.* (noting that under a disjunctive reading, the sale of powdered sugar could be criminalized if the seller represents that it is cocaine); [Hodge](#), 321 F.3d 429 (rejecting a disjunctive approach and holding that selling a mixture of wax and flour is not criminalized merely because the seller represented it to be “crack cocaine”).

Moreover, the legislative history of the Act suggests that such bizarre consequences were not intended by Congress. The Act was intended primarily to prevent scientists from slightly modifying the chemical structure of banned drugs to create new “designer drugs” that would have similar physiological effects but would not be covered by the law's controlled substances schedules. *See, e.g., Hodge*, 321 F.3d 429 (conducting an extensive review of the Act's legislative history). According to one court, there is “not a scintilla of evidence” that “Congress intended to cover and criminalize sales of legal substances such as flour, salt, ginseng, vitamin B, etc., merely because the seller represents that they will yield a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect like that of a controlled substance.” [Clifford](#), 197 F.Supp.2d at 520-21. The court in [Clifford](#) also pointed out that Congress is capable of indicating an unambiguous disjunctive intent when it so desires: In at least one other provision of this very Act ([§ 802\(9\)](#)), a number of subordinate causes are listed in a fashion similar to [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), but each subsection is separated by the word “or” to indicate a clear disjunctive intent. *Id.* at 519-20.

Given that the text of the Act does not clearly demand either reading, we find the practical policy considerations identified by our sister courts compelling, especially when coupled with the Act's overall structure and legislative history. We therefore elect to heed the call of both accumulated precedent and common sense, joining the vast majority of federal courts in adopting the conjunctive reading of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#). Accordingly, the district court's disjunctive jury instruction was error. However, as will be discussed presently, this error was not ultimately prejudicial to Turcotte.

[2] The parties' dispute over the import of the district court's disjunctive jury instruction seems to reflect fundamentally different readings of the jury's special verdict forms and the Presentence Investigation Report. Turcotte alleges that the jury found BD to be an analogue of GHB based on the fact that it satisfied only clause two of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) (similar effect on the nervous system), and that therefore, since his conviction and sentence as to possession and distribution of BD was based on an erroneous disjunctive reading of the Act, he is entitled to relief in this Court.

The government responds by arguing that, since the jury found BD to satisfy only clause two of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), Turcotte was not convicted or sentenced for possession or distribution of BD at all. In effect, the government alleges that the jury and the probation officer preparing the Presentence Investigation Report read [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) conjunctively, notwithstanding the district court's disjunctive instruction. The government claims that Turcotte's sentence was based purely on his possession

and distribution of GBL, which the jury found satisfied all three clauses of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) (and thus would have qualified as an analogue of GHB under either a disjunctive or conjunctive reading of the Act).

The written record favors the government on this point. Turcotte's claims here seem to be moot. First, it is important to note that, by their own terms, Turcotte's *524 arguments on this issue relate only to BD; both parties agree that the jury found GBL to meet all three clauses of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), and thus that Turcotte would have been convicted for possession and distribution of GBL under either reading of the statute. As such, Turcotte's claims here only have traction if he was indeed convicted of possession with intent to distribute BD (as an analogue of GHB) and separately sentenced for this offense. The Presentencing Investigation Report reveals that Turcotte's conviction did not rest on his possession or distribution of BD, and it unequivocally states that his possession and distribution of BD did not affect calculation of his sentence. While the Report initially states that Turcotte was convicted of “conspiring with Brian Gore to possess with the intent to distribute, and possessing with the intent to distribute, GHB, GBL, and BD,” it later makes clear that the jury did not find BD to be a controlled substance analogue and, accordingly, that Turcotte's possession of BD did not play any role in his conviction or sentencing:

With specific regard to BD (1,4 Butanediol), the jury has returned a special verdict which states that BD is *not* a Schedule I Narcotic Drug Controlled Substance analogue, because BD's chemical structure is not significantly similar to the chemical structure of GHB. Thus the amounts of Flower Power (BD) and any other substances which contained BD *are not included in the amounts of controlled substances for which the defendant is accountable*, notwithstanding his possession and distribution of said substances.

(emphasis added). The Report then went on to state that even “[i]f the Court were to rule that BD is a controlled substance analogue of GBL, a Schedule I depressant, in contravention of the jury's special verdict, the number of units of BD involved in this case ... *would not increase the base offense level applicable to this offense.*” (emphasis added).

No matter how one looks at it, BD simply does not appear to have been factored into Turcotte's sentencing. Thus the district court's disjunctive jury instruction, while erroneous, cannot be said to have prejudiced Turcotte. In fact, the district court seems to presage this ruling in its order denying Turcotte's post-trial motion for a judgment of acquittal or a new trial, stating that it was actually “inclined to agree” with Turcotte's arguments for a conjunctive reading of the Act, but that “such a determination ... does not affect defendant's conviction.” [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). Given the prior absence of a clear ruling on the issue in this circuit, the district court's decision to have the jury rule separately on each element of the Analogue Provision appears an appropriate jurisprudential precaution. As such, we have no occasion to reverse the district court's ruling on this narrow constructional issue, though we hereby serve notice that courts in this circuit should henceforth apply a conjunctive reading of the CSA's Analogue Provision.

B. The District Court's Instructions on Scienter

[\[3\]](#) Turcotte next alleges that the district court improperly instructed the jury that they could convict him under [§ 841\(a\)](#) even if he did not know that GBL was an illegal controlled substance analogue. In proceedings below, the district court gave the following instruction:

To sustain the charge in Count Five of possessing with intent to distribute mixtures containing a controlled substance, the government must prove the following propositions: First, the defendant *525 knowingly and intentionally possessed mixtures containing GBL; Second, the defendant possessed mixtures containing GBL with the intent to deliver it to another person; and Third, that mixtures containing GBL are an analogue of GHB, a Schedule I Controlled Substance. *It does not matter whether the defendant knew the substance was a controlled substance, only that it was a mixture containing GBL.*

(emphasis added). We review *de novo* a district court's denial of a requested jury instruction. See [Slater](#), 348 F.3d 666.

The district court and the government argue for application of the time honored maxim that “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” They contend that [§ 841\(a\)](#) does not require knowledge that the substance in question is a controlled substance—a defendant must merely know the identity of the substance being possessed and distributed. See [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). The district court expresses some doubt about this conclusion however, conceding “[p]erhaps that goes too far, as it might, possibly, in other circumstances, ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” *Id.* Nonetheless, the government and the district court stand firm, maintaining that even if knowledge of a substance's illegality is required under the Act, the special jury forms used in this case resolve the issue, as they indicate the jury found that Turcotte “represented

or intended” that GBL had physiological effects “substantially similar to or greater than” GHB, a controlled substance in Schedule I.

Such a position is extremely problematic, however, since the Analogue Provision imposes criminal liability through the more general provisions of the CSA, [18 U.S.C. § 841\(a\)](#), which implicate a well-established scienter requirement. This Court has previously held on multiple occasions that as a prerequisite to liability for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute under [§ 841\(a\)](#), defendants must know that the substance in question is a controlled substance. [United States v. Barlow](#), 310 F.3d 1007, 1012 (7th Cir.2002) (“[Section 841\(a\)](#) requires only that defendant know that he possesses a controlled substance; it does not require that he know the type of controlled substance he possesses.”); [Lanier v. United States](#), 220 F.3d 833, 840 (7th Cir.2000) (requiring “knowledge that [the drug] is a controlled substance”); [U.S. v. Jones](#), 248 F.3d 671, 675 (7th Cir.2001) (citing *Lanier* for the same rule). In fact the Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions articulate the same standard: “It is sufficient that the defendant knew that the substance was some kind of prohibited drug. It does not matter whether the defendant knew the substance was [a specific drug].” STAR Modern Federal Jury Instructions-Criminal, § 7-202-03, [21 U.S.C. § 841\(a\)\(1\)](#) (2004).

Yet these precedents read awkwardly in the context of the present case, since they assume the paradigmatic drug case in which the substances involved are per se illegal substances such as cocaine, heroin and the like. All of the aforementioned Seventh Circuit cases involve prosecutions for per se illegal drugs like cocaine base (*Barlow*), marijuana (*Lanier*) and crack cocaine (*Jones*). In such cases, knowledge of the specific substance involved will usually automatically imply knowledge that the substance is controlled. ^{FN2} Or, even if the distributor*526 of the substance does not know its specific identity, he or she is at least aware that it is a controlled substance. See, e.g., [Barlow](#), 310 F.3d at 1012. Here, and in other analogue cases under [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), the opposite is true—many newly engineered and relatively unknown substances may be involved such that knowledge of the substance's identity does not automatically imply knowledge of its status as a controlled substance. Indeed new “designer drugs” are often created as alternatives to known illegal drugs precisely because they may be sold with an appearance of *legality*. Unable to keep its controlled substance schedules current in the face of accelerating innovations in drug technology, Congress enacted the Analogue Provision to target distribution of just such substances.

FN2. The government cites [United States v. Hussein](#), 351 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir.2003), [United States v. Cain](#), 130 F.3d 381, 384 (9th Cir.1997), [United States v. Barbosa](#), 271 F.3d 438, 457-58 (3d Cir.2001) and [United States v. Fuller](#), 162 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir.1998), for the proposition that convictions under the CSA do not require defendants to know that the substances in question are controlled substances. These citations are quite misleading. Despite the government's contrary contentions (or insinuations), all of these cases affirm the baseline principle that defendants must know that the substances in their possession are controlled substances to be convicted under the CSA, even if they do not know the exact identity of the substance they possess. In other words, the language cited by the government deals with defendants' legal rather than factual knowledge. Defendants need not know that possession of a controlled substance is illegal, but they still must know that they possess a controlled substance.

All of these cases also involve traditional, well-known narcotics that are illegal per se, such as cocaine (*Cain*), heroin and cocaine base (*Barbosa*) and crack (*Fuller*). Thus, once again, knowledge of the drug's identity would be sufficient to establish knowledge of the drug's status as controlled. The *Hussein* case involves a nontraditional drug called khat, and the *Hussein* court accordingly recognized the traditional/nontraditional distinction (though not in those terms), requiring the defendant to know both that he possessed khat *and* that khat in turn contained the controlled substance cathinone. [351 F.3d at 17](#).

And therein lies the rub. The CSA requires a showing of scienter, but the exact contours of this requirement are not obvious in the context of the Analogue Provision. At least one court has ruled that “the definition of controlled substance analogue does not require *any* scienter—a defendant does not have to ‘know’ that a substance has a substantially similar chemical structure to an illegal drug.” [Forbes](#), 806 F.Supp. at 238. See also [United States v. Carlson](#), 87 F.3d 440, 443 n. 3 (11th Cir.1996) (citing *Forbes* and noting “the absence of a scienter requirement in the Analogue Act”). Other courts have applied the more general scienter requirement of the CSA, [18 U.S.C. § 841\(a\)](#), holding that the Analogue Provision “requires the Government to show that the defendants knew that they possessed a controlled substance.” [Roberts](#), 363 F.3d at 123 n. 1. Under this construction, defendants “need not know the exact nature of the drug; it is sufficient that they be aware that they possessed ‘some controlled substance.’” *Id.* (citing [United States v. Morales](#), 577 F.2d 769, 776 (2d Cir.1978)). Neither of these approaches seems especially satisfying.

In this particular context, applying the standard requirement that a defendant must know the substance in question is a

“controlled substance” is nonsensical since controlled substance analogues are, by definition, not “controlled substances”- their distribution is criminalized, despite their omission from the government's controlled substances schedules, because they have similar chemical structures and either actually or purportedly similar physiological effects to controlled substances. A substance's legal status as a controlled substance analogue is not a fact that a defendant can know conclusively *ex ante*; it is a fact that the jury must find at trial (applying*527 the three clauses of the Analogue Provision).^{FN3} Direct and literal application of the scienter requirement applicable to [§ 841\(a\)](#), in other words, would threaten to eviscerate the Analogue Provisions of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) at one stroke.

^{FN3}. Such a situation might appear to raise vagueness concerns, and the Second Circuit's recent decision in *United States v. Ansaldi* is instructive on this point. The court begins by noting that “[i]t is an interesting question under what circumstances a statute that depends on the resolution of a factual question about which reasonable juries can disagree is specific enough to withstand a vagueness challenge.” [372 F.3d 118, 123 \(2d Cir.2004\)](#). The court then notes that “[j]uries are often required to determine not only whether certain conduct occurred but also whether the conduct falls within the definition of a statute,” citing the Supreme Court's ruling, in considering an obscenity law, that “the possibility that different juries might reach different conclusions as to the same material does not render the statute unconstitutional.” *Id.* at 123 n. 2 (citing *Smith v. United States*, 431 U.S. 291, 309, 97 S.Ct. 1756, 52 L.Ed.2d 324 (1977)). Statutes only encounter vagueness difficulties if their terms are “so vague that a jury's determination is likely to be arbitrary, and, consequently, those terms would not allow an ordinary person to understand what conduct is prohibited.” *Id.* For more discussion of such issues, see our discussion of the vagueness question, *infra*.

On the other hand, doing away with the scienter requirement altogether could, as the district court realized, “ensnare individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). Such a construction also would make the Analogue Provision more vulnerable to vagueness challenges. See *Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman Estates, Inc.*, 455 U.S. 489, 499, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (“[A] scienter requirement [in a criminal statute] may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct was proscribed.”); *Roberts*, 363 F.3d at 123 (“Because the statute at issue here contains a scienter requirement ... the defendants' vagueness challenge must be met with some measure of skepticism”). Discarding the scienter requirement would essentially mean that individuals deal in narcotics substitutes at their own risk, removing a primary *mens rea* element of possession and distribution offenses.

[4] In light of all these considerations, we feel that our precedents demand a showing that the defendant knew the substance in question was a controlled substance analogue. That is, the defendant must know that the substance at issue meets the definition of a controlled substance analogue set forth in [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#): A defendant must know that the substance at issue has a chemical structure substantially similar to that of a controlled substance, and he or she must either know that it has similar physiological effects or intend or represent that it has such effects. We recognize that requiring the government to prove scienter as to these criteria may impose a significant prosecutorial burden in some cases. The question of similar chemical structure is particularly nettlesome since, even if such chemical similarities exist, and even if the defendant is aware of these similarities, the intricacies of chemical science may render it extremely difficult to *prove* that a defendant had such knowledge. As a provisional remedy for this problem, we prescribe that, in such cases, if the scienter requirement is met with regard to the second part of the analogue definition (knowledge or representation of similar physiological effects), the jury is permitted-but not required-to infer that the defendant also had knowledge of the relevant chemical similarities.^{FN4}

^{FN4}. As both the Supreme Court and this Court have made clear, this kind of non-mandatory inference does not place any improper evidentiary burden on the defendant as long as “there is a ‘rational connection’ between the basic facts that the prosecution proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the latter is ‘more likely than not to flow from’ the former.” *County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen*, 442 U.S. 140, 165, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). The jury is always free to accept or reject any such permissible inference, and it remains the government's burden to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Such carefully circumscribed inferences and presumptions are thus a “staple of our adversary system of factfinding.” *Id.* at 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213. This is especially so where questions of knowledge or intent are at issue since, as a practical matter, a defendant's state of mind always “must be determined circumstantially, by inference.” *Pigee v. Israel*, 670 F.2d 690, 692 (7th Cir.1982). By contrast, mandatory or conclusive presumptions, which *require* the jury to infer some “ultimate” or “elemental” fact from the existence of “evidentiary” or “basic” facts, present much stickier constitutional problems. For definitive discussions of inferences, presumptions and the issues surrounding them, see *Allen*, 442 U.S. at 156-67, 99 S.Ct. 2213; *Sandstrom v. Montana*, 442 U.S. 510, 514-27, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979); *Pigee*, 670 F.2d at 692-97.

***528** This approach is justified since, as a practical matter, defendants who know or represent to others that the substance in question has physiological effects similar to a controlled substance are likely to be aware of basic chemical similarities as well, even if that fact is difficult to prove conclusively. This approach also dovetails with the commonsense recognition that, in selling or purchasing such substances, all parties to the transaction are primarily interested (perhaps solely interested) in the substance's physiological effects. Yet at the same time, if the defendant truly had no knowledge of the substance's chemical character, or if, under the circumstances, chemical complexities make such knowledge extremely unlikely, an avenue should be left open for defendants to refute such an inference. In any case, our well-established jurisprudence regarding the scienter requirements of controlled substances violations require that juries confront these questions of knowledge squarely.

The district court, while acknowledging that the scienter requirement implied by its own jury instruction “[p]erhaps goes too far,” maintains that its jury instructions were non-prejudicial since the jury specifically determined that Turcotte represented or intended that GBL had physiological effects similar to GHB. [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). However, as just discussed, while such a determination suffices to demonstrate scienter with respect to the second prong of the analogue definition (actual or intended similar physiological effect), it is not equivalent to finding *knowledge* of actual chemical similarity. One could represent to others (earnestly or not) that a substance has physiological effects similar to a controlled substance despite being totally ignorant of its actual chemical properties. Turcotte's representations as to the physiological effects of GBL do support an inference that such knowledge existed, but the jury did not confront this question directly below. Given the evidence adduced at trial, it appears a jury certainly could have determined that Turcotte had the requisite knowledge to trigger liability under [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) (though the evidence does not compel such a conclusion).^{[FN5](#)} However, the jury was ***529** specifically instructed to forego this determination. The district court's instructions as to scienter were thus, at best, incomplete and, at worst, highly misleading as to the prerequisites for liability under the Analogue Provision.

^{[FN5](#)} There is evidence that the website through which Turcotte sold Verve 5.0(GBL) contained assertions that Verve is the “absolute finest quality GHB precursor” and that its ingredients are “illegal nationwide.” For his part, Turcotte attempts to blunt the import of this evidence, claiming that he played no part in building the website and had no knowledge of GBL's chemical similarities to GHB. While Turcotte's testimony on this score perhaps seems dubious, we recognize that weighing contradictory evidence and making credibility determinations are functions generally reserved for the jury. Accordingly, on appeal we may not impute the requisite knowledge to Turcotte based on these website assertions, however much they may affect the equities of the situation.

^{[\[5\]](#)} Ordinarily such shortcomings might amount to reversible error, but in the present case we find any deficiencies in the district court's scienter instructions harmless. The jury specifically found that Turcotte knew the substance he possessed contained GBL, and unlike many other potential controlled substance analogues, Congress has specifically identified GBL as an analogue of GHB. See [United States v. Ansal di](#), 372 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir.2004) (“GBL is one of the substances that the statute actually identifies as a potential controlled substance analogue.”); [United States v. Fisher](#), 289 F.3d at 1336 (noting that “statements found in [Public Law 106-172](#) and the DEA's Final Rules indicate that both Congress and the DEA considered GBL to be an analogue of GHB.”).

In amending the Controlled Substances Act to include GHB, Congress declared that “[i]f taken for human consumption, common industrial chemicals such as gamma butyrolactone [GBL] and 1,4-butanediol [BD] are swiftly converted by the body into GHB. Illicit use of *these and other GHB analogues* and precursor chemicals is a significant and growing law enforcement problem.” Pub. Law No. 106-172, § 2(4) (2000) (emphasis added). DEA regulations also specify that “GBL and 1,4-butanediol are *structurally and pharmacologically similar to GHB* and are often substituted for GHB. Under certain circumstances they may satisfy the definition of a controlled substance analogue.” [Placement of Gamma-Butyrolactone in List I of the Controlled Substances Act](#), 65 Fed.Reg. 21,645-47 (April 24, 2000) (emphasis added). As the Second Circuit asserted in *Ansal di*, “[r]egardless of any other ways in which the laws governing controlled substance[s] might be vague, there is one thing they make perfectly clear—the sale of GBL for human consumption is illegal.” [372 F.3d at 122](#). Cf. [United States v. Washam](#), 312 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir.2002) (holding that these Congressional pronouncements also confirm BD's status as a controlled substance analogue).

In our view such pronouncements are sufficient to put any drug merchant on notice that GBL qualifies as a controlled substance analogue.^{[FN6](#)} Thus having acknowledged that he *knew* he was selling substances containing GBL, Turcotte cannot then turn around and claim that he had no knowledge of GBL's status as an analogue of GHB.^{[FN7](#)} As with other known controlled substances (including GHB), knowledge of the substance's specific identity implies knowledge of the substance's legal status. Ignorance of the relevant legal provisions is no defense. See [Ansal di](#), 372 F.3d at 128 (holding that defendants'

belief that “they were breaking no law by selling GBL” does not constitute a defense); [United States v. Desurra](#), 865 F.2d 651, 653 (5th Cir.1989) (similar holding).

[FN6](#). See also our discussion of Turcotte's vagueness claims, *infra* at section III-D.

[FN7](#). We pause to note that the jury also found that Turcotte intended or represented that GBL has similar physiological effects to GHB. Thus, as a matter of common sense, it would seem strange to allow Turcotte to claim he did not know GBL is an analogue of GHB.

Applied to any other controlled substance analogue, an instruction such as the *530 one given here might well warrant reversal of a conviction. However, given the clear Congressional and regulatory pronouncements of the status of GBL, any error in the district court's scienter instructions was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court on this issue.

C. The *Brady* Claim

[\[6\]\[7\]\[8\]](#) Turcotte next claims that the prosecution violated his rights under [Brady v. Maryland](#), 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by improperly withholding FDA Investigational New Drug Applications (INDs) during the trial. *Brady* instructs that the prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose all information that is (1) in the government's possession, (2) material and (3) exculpatory. [United States v. Bhutani](#), 175 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir.1999); [United States v. Hartbarger](#), 148 F.3d 777, 786 (7th Cir.1998). Under our precedents, any evidence whose “suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial is considered material.” [United States v. Gonzalez](#), 93 F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted). Crucially, district courts have broad discretion in determining *Brady* violations, and so this Court reviews the decision below only for abuse of discretion. [United States v. Knight](#), 342 F.3d 697, 705 (7th Cir.2003) (“The district court maintains broad discretion to determine *Brady* violations; we will review the exercise of that discretion for abuse only.”); [United States v. Wilson](#), 237 F.3d 827 (7th Cir.2001) (same rule).

In the decision below, the district court ruled that the government disclosed the INDs “promptly after learning of their existence” such that “[d]efense attorneys were ... able to review the material and use it during the trial.” [286 F.Supp.2d at 951](#). The district court further determined that the INDs contained no real exculpatory information and that any government delay in producing the materials did not undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. *Id.* Turcotte, on the other hand, claims that the government was 18 months late in disclosing the INDs, and that the INDs were exculpatory since they contained information that contradicted the testimony of government expert witnesses regarding the harmful effects of GHB, including FDA approval of [Xyrem](#), a drug used for treating [narcolepsy](#) that contains GHB. Turcotte claims that because of the government's tardy disclosure, his own expert witnesses did not have sufficient time to review these INDs and thus that he was not able to present this exculpatory evidence at trial.

[\[9\]](#) If only Turcotte had bought and distributed [Xyrem](#) to treat [narcolepsy](#), he might have a colorable claim. As it is, his *Brady* claim fails. It is undisputed that the government did disclose the material in question, albeit somewhat later than it ought, and the district court determined that Turcotte had sufficient time to review the materials and use them in his defense. The district court also allowed Turcotte to recall government expert witnesses after presentation of the prosecution's case in chief and cross-examine them as to information contained in the INDs, though Turcotte apparently declined to do so.

Lastly, even if the INDs contain the information that Turcotte alleges, they do not change the fact that GHB was a Schedule I controlled substance at the time of Turcotte's alleged conduct, that GBL was found by the jury to be an analogue of GHB and that Turcotte sold GBL for impermissible purposes. The other medical uses of GHB allegedly described in the INDs are not particularly *531 relevant to Turcotte's conduct or to the facts of this case. That GHB may have been approved for another use as a component of some other drug does not alter the fundamental basis of Turcotte's liability. The district court has broad discretion in identifying *Brady* violations, and nothing in the record suggests that the district court abused this discretion. We therefore affirm the ruling of the district court rejecting Turcotte's *Brady* claim.

D. The Vagueness Claim

[\[10\]](#) Turcotte's final major claim is that the Analogue Provision of the CSA is unconstitutionally vague in that “it fails to provide fair notice to the public regarding what substances are ‘analogues’ and therefore prohibited.” Under *Kolender v. Lawson*, a penal statute is void for vagueness if it does not define an offense with sufficient clarity to allow people of

ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct is prohibited or if it is so vague as to allow for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. [461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 \(1983\)](#). Turcotte claims that the term “substantially similar” in [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) is too vague to advise people of ordinary intelligence as to which substances qualify as controlled substance analogues. The district court disagreed, ruling that “a person of ordinary intelligence should recognize the similarity between GBL and GHB, and that [Section 802\(32\)\(A\)](#) is not unconstitutionally vague.” [286 F.Supp.2d at 951-52](#) (citing [Fisher, 289 F.3d at 1338-39](#)). We review *de novo* a challenge to the constitutionality of a federal statute. [United States v. Vallejo, 373 F.3d 855, 859 \(7th Cir.2004\)](#).

In support of his contention, Turcotte claims there is no scientific consensus on the chemical similarity of GBL to GHB (while it is undisputed that the two compounds differ only by a few atoms, they are classified as different types of compounds and have different physical shapes) nor any established scientific definition of the term “substantially similar” as applied to questions of molecular chemistry. Turcotte also points out that several common substances either contain GHB or convert to GHB at some point in the human metabolic process, which makes the targeting of GBL and GHB essentially arbitrary.

[\[11\]](#) These points are well-taken, but the relevant case law suggests that Turcotte faces an uphill battle. As an initial matter, we note that our ruling here confirming that the Analogue Provision carries a robust scienter requirement casts doubt on Turcotte's vagueness challenge from the outset. *Cf. Roberts, 363 F.3d at 123* (“Because the statute at issue here [[§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#)] contains a scienter requirement ... the defendants' vagueness challenge must be met with some measure of skepticism, at least with regard to the ‘fair notice’ prong of *Kolender*.”) Under Supreme Court precedent, the constitutionality of an allegedly vague statutory standard “is closely related to whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.” [Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395, 99 S.Ct. 675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 \(1979\)](#). Specifically, due process concerns about notice are “ameliorated” when a statute contains a scienter requirement. [Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 147 L.Ed.2d 597 \(2000\)](#).

Yet even leaving aside the implications of our scienter ruling, the Analogue Provision seems to us sufficiently clear by its own terms. The circuit courts considering this issue have unanimously held that the CSA's Analogue Provision is not unconstitutionally vague. *See, e.g., *532 United States v. Granberry, 916 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir.1990)* (ruling that the CSA's Analogue Provision is “clearly and specifically defined, in terms readily comprehensible to the ordinary reader”); [United States v. Klecker, 348 F.3d 69, 72 \(4th Cir.2003\)](#); [United States v. Orchard, 332 F.3d 1133, 1137-38 \(8th Cir.2003\)](#); [United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 930-32 \(8th Cir.2002\)](#); [Carlson, 87 F.3d at 443-44](#); [United States v. Hofstatter, 8 F.3d 316, 321-22 \(6th Cir.1993\)](#); [United States v. Desurra, 865 F.2d 651, 653 \(5th Cir.1989\)](#) (per curiam). The one contrary precedent, which Turcotte cites in support of his own arguments, is [United States v. Forbes, 806 F.Supp. 232 \(D.Colo.1992\)](#), in which a district court held the Analogue Provision to be unconstitutionally vague as applied to the drug AET. The court in *Forbes* found the Act lacking with respect to AET because “there is no scientific consensus whether AET has a chemical structure that is substantially similar to DMT or DET. The government's own chemists cannot agree on this point [t]he scientific community cannot even agree on a methodology to use to determine structural similarity.” *Id.* at 237.

Again, *Forbes* is instructive so far as it goes, but, it can be distinguished from the instant case since it involved AET rather than GBL. This distinction is crucial because no fewer than three courts of appeals have held the Analogue Provision to be sufficiently clear with respect to GBL and/or BD. In *United States v. Roberts*, the Second Circuit held that the Analogue Provision was not unconstitutionally vague in identifying BD as an analogue of GHB, stating that the acknowledged similarity in the chemical structures of the two compounds, *combined with the fact that* BD turns into GHB when ingested, are collectively sufficient to put an ordinary person on notice that BD is an analogue of GHB for purposes of the CSA. [363 F.3d at 125](#). The *Roberts* court insists that these two factors, when considered together, make the legal implications of the Analogue Provision clear with respect to BD, notwithstanding the fine-grained scientific distinctions of expert chemists. [363 F.3d at 127](#).^{FN8}

^{FN8}. The exact language of the *Roberts* court's analysis reads as follows:

Given the combination of GHB's cognizable similarity to 1,4-butanediol prior to ingestion and its metabolization into that controlled substance after ingestion, the classification of 1,4-butanediol as a controlled substance analogue is clearly mandated by the Act's language, and remains so regardless of the differences of view among the experts. In short, given the circumstances of this case, an evaluation of the the statute's vagueness as-applied does not call for the fine distinctions drawn by the experts.

[363 F.3d at 127](#).

Another Second Circuit panel, convened not three months later, used this same analytical approach to conclude that “the definition of ‘controlled substance analogue’ is *not unconstitutionally vague as applied to GBL*.” [Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 124](#) (citing *Roberts* and pointing to “uncontroverted testimony that GBL’s chemical structure differed from that of GHB by only three atoms” and that “GBL converted into GHB after ingestion”) (emphasis added). The *Ansaldi* court also points out forcefully that “GBL is one of the substances that the statute actually identifies as a potential controlled substance analogue.” [372 F.3d at 123](#).^{FN9} These same *533 points are echoed in *United States v. Fisher*, where the Eleventh Circuit also held that the Analogue Provision is sufficiently clear with respect to the status of GBL. The *Fisher* court likewise notes that [GBL converts into GHB when ingested, 289 F.3d at 1338-39](#), and observes that “statements found in [Public Law 106-172](#) and the DEA’s Final Rules indicate that both Congress and the DEA considered GBL to be an analogue of GHB.” [289 F.3d at 1336](#).

^{FN9}. The *Ansaldi* court speaks in no uncertain terms on the vagueness issue:

Regardless of any other ways in which the laws governing controlled substance[s] might be vague, there is one thing they make perfectly clear—the sale of GBL for human consumption is illegal.

....

The subsection defining “controlled substance analogue” specifically states that “[t]he designation of gamma butyrolactone ... as a listed chemical ... *does not preclude* a finding ... that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue.” [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)\(B\)](#) (emphasis supplied). Thus, GBL is one of the substances that the statute actually identifies as a potential controlled substance analogue.

372 F.3d at 122-23.

Among these Congressional “statements” is the following declaration: “If taken for human consumption, common industrial chemicals such as gamma butyrolactone [GBL] and 1,4-butanediol [BD] are swiftly converted by the body into GHB. Illicit use of *these and other GHB analogues* and precursor chemicals is a significant and growing law enforcement problem.” Pub. Law No. 106-172, § 2(4) (2000) (emphasis added). DEA regulations contain similar statements: “GBL and 1,4-butanediol are *structurally and pharmacologically similar to GHB* and are often substituted for GHB. Under certain circumstances they may satisfy the definition of a controlled substance analogue.” [Placement of Gamma-Butyrolactone in List I of the Controlled Substances Act, 65 Fed.Reg. 21,645-47 \(April 24, 2000\)](#) (emphasis added).^{FN10}

^{FN10}. See also our discussion of these provisions in relation to Turcotte’s scienter claim, *supra* at section III-B.

Admittedly, these provisions may not be using the terms “analogue” or “similar” in their technical statutory sense under the CSA, but nonetheless it is difficult indeed to claim that Turcotte lacked notice as to the chemical similarities of GBL and GHB, or as to the likelihood of being prosecuted for distribution of GBL. Indeed, Turcotte advertised Verve 5.0 as a GHB substitute on his website, which actually stated that Verve is illegal.^{FN11} As the Second Circuit asserted in *Ansaldi*, “[r]egardless of any other ways in which the laws governing controlled substance[s] might be vague, there is one thing they make perfectly clear—the sale of GBL for human consumption is illegal.” [372 F.3d at 122](#).

^{FN11}. See footnote 5, *supra*.

This level of clarity also speaks to the second prong of the *Kolender* test, which concerns arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement. Law enforcement officials, no less than potential drug distributors, are on notice that GBL is considered an illegal analogue of GHB when sold for human consumption, and they are directed to aggressively prosecute its possession and sale. In short, it is not left to the police to arbitrarily determine the legal status of GHB, GBL or BD—Congress has spoken clearly with respect to these substances.

Given the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s ruling that the CSA is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to GBL as an analogue of GHB.

E. The Status of GBL and BD as Controlled Substance Analogues

Having assailed the district court's jury instructions, the government's conduct during discovery and the constitutionality of the Analogue Provision itself, Turcotte next challenges the applicability of the Analogue Provision to the substances at issue in this case. His claims on this score are essentially twofold: (1) that federal law prevents BD and GBL from being *534 regulated, and, even if GBL and BD are subject to regulation, their status is confusing and the rule of lenity should be applied in Turcotte's favor, and (2) that GHB was not properly scheduled as a controlled substance since its scheduling (allegedly done at the behest of the Attorney General) has expired and therefore Turcotte cannot be punished for trafficking in its chemical analogues. Both claims are frivolous and fail on their own terms. ^{FN12}

^{FN12} The government argues for a deferential standard of review as to these claims, noting that they were either raised in an untimely filed post-trial motion, *United States v. Withers*, 972 F.2d 837, 844 (7th Cir.1992) (reviewing such claims for clear error), or raised for the first time on appeal. *United States v. Noble*, 246 F.3d 946, 955 (7th Cir.2001) (reviewing such claims for clear error). The exact standard of review applicable here is of no consequence, since Turcotte's claims are doomed even under *de novo* review.

1. The Regulation of BD and GBL as Controlled Substance Analogues Under Federal Law

[12] Turcotte first claims that the Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA), [21 U.S.C. § 321](#), precludes regulation of GBL and BD since both substances are dietary supplements and thus must be treated as “food” under the DSHEA. Turcotte also asserts that because GBL is a “List I chemical” under [21 U.S.C. §§ 802\(33\)](#) and [802\(34\)](#), pursuant to an April 2000 DEA Final Rule, GBL is not subject to regulation. These arguments are, at best, unpersuasive and, at worst, disingenuous. The district court noted below that the DSHEA “does not prevent the classification of GBL as a controlled substance analogue,” [286 F.Supp.2d at 952](#), and the government points out that GBL meets the DSHEA's definition of a “drug” and is known as a common industrial chemical. In fact Turcotte himself labeled his shipments of Verve to Internet customers as “cleaning supplies” or “supplies,” not dietary supplements. *Id.* The DSHEA does not address GBL or BD specifically, so both parties are essentially attempting to shoehorn these substances into the DSHEA's general definitions. This is a dubious enterprise considering that the CSA addresses the status of GBL explicitly, stating that it is a “List I chemical” under [21 U.S.C. §§ 802\(33\)](#) and [802\(34\)](#). This appears the more relevant provision for our purposes.

Perhaps realizing this, Turcotte next claims that GBL's status as a “Listed chemical” under the CSA precludes its regulation as a controlled substance. To support this contention, Turcotte points to a DEA regulation which states, in part, that “[c]hemical mixtures containing GBL ... are not subject to regulation.” [65 Fed.Reg. 21,645 \(Apr. 24, 2000\)](#). But this line of argument is patently without merit. The very regulation cited by Turcotte also explicitly states that the CSA, at [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#), expressly provides that “the designation of GBL or any other chemical as a Listed chemical does *not* preclude a finding that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue and subject to the provisions of [21 U.S.C. 813](#).” [65 Fed.Reg. 21,645 \(Apr. 24, 2000\)](#) (citing [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)](#)) (emphasis added). *See also* [Ansaldi](#), [372 F.3d at 128 n. 6](#) (also ruling that GBL's status as a listed chemical under DEA regulations does not preclude its regulation as a controlled substance analogue under the CSA). In fact Turcotte himself concedes that the clear provisions of the CSA (at [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)\(B\)](#)) doom his argument, though he tries to blunt the impact of this point by hiding it in a footnote. *See* Appellant's Br. at 30 n. 11 (conceding that “GBL's designation as a listed *535 chemical does not preclude a finding that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue. [21 U.S.C. § 802\(32\)\(B\)](#).”).

[13] Having obliterated his own argument regarding GBL's susceptibility to regulation, Turcotte next argues in the alternative that, even if GBL can be regulated as a controlled substance analogue (as he concedes), the various laws and regulations cited here render GBL's status confusing, and the rule of lenity should be applied to reverse his conviction. While the rule of lenity instructs that ambiguity in the meaning of a statutory provision should be resolved in favor of the defendant, this principle is only applicable where there is a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act.” *U.S. v. Ranum*, [96 F.3d 1020, 1030 \(7th Cir.1996\)](#) (quoting *United States v. Neal*, [46 F.3d 1405, 1410 \(7th Cir.1995\)](#)) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the rule of lenity “only serves as an aide for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one.” *Callanan v. United States*, [364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 \(1961\)](#).

As just discussed, the law is perfectly clear on this point: As per both the CSA itself and the DEA regulation cited by Turcotte, GBL is not exempt from regulation under the CSA as a controlled substance analogue. Turcotte himself acknowledges this fact in his brief. *See* Appellant's Br. at 30, n. 11. *See also* [Ansaldi](#), [372 F.3d at 128 n. 6](#) (observing that the DEA “regulation [concerning GBL] does not even purport to remove any substance from the realm of criminal conduct.”). The rule of lenity is not applicable here. This is especially so given our rejection of Turcotte's vagueness claims ^{FN13} it would be passing strange for us to rule that a statute, while not unconstitutionally vague, is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the

rule of lenity.

[FN13](#). See discussion of Turcotte's vagueness claim, *supra*.

For all of these reasons, Turcotte's claim that federal law precludes the regulation of GBL as an analogue of GHB are patently without merit.

2. GHB's Status as a Controlled Substance

Having attempted to question GBL's susceptibility to regulation in its own right, Turcotte next claims that GHB was not properly scheduled as a controlled substance, and therefore that GBL cannot be regulated as a controlled substance analogue of GHB. Turcotte asserts that GHB was put on Schedule I at the behest of the Attorney General in March of 2000 as a temporary or emergency scheduling under [21 U.S.C. § 811\(h\)](#), which expires if not made permanent within one year. Turcotte then claims that since GHB's status as a Schedule I controlled substance allegedly expired in March of 2001, he cannot be convicted for possession or distribution of its analogues, including GBL. The government responds by asserting that Congress directed the Attorney General to place GHB on Schedule I in [Public Law 106-172](#), and thus that the aforementioned time limit applicable to emergency schedulings should not apply.

[\[14\]](#) We need not attempt to navigate this legislative thicket because Turcotte's expiration claim fails for a more basic reason: Even if the scheduling of GHB expired in March of 2001 as Turcotte claims, it is undisputed that GHB was still a Schedule I controlled substance at the time of the conduct leading to Turcotte's arrest and conviction (the summer of *536 2000). [FN14](#) Matters of timing similarly thwart Turcotte's claim that FDA approval of [Xyrem](#)-a drug for treating [narcolepsy](#) that contains GHB-in July of 2002 converted GHB to a Schedule III substance not subject to the CSA's Analogue Provision. Aside from the fact that FDA approval of a specific drug for certain medical uses need not have any bearing on the status of its component chemicals in non-medical contexts, the FDA's approval of [Xyrem](#) came *after* Turcotte's misconduct and subsequent arrest in September of 2000. Thus, even if the FDA approval of [Xyrem](#) has some effect on the status of GHB as a controlled substance-a proposition which appears extremely dubious to begin with-that approval still would not have any bearing on Turcotte's conviction.

[FN14](#). The district court makes precisely this point in its ruling below, noting that “even if we were to accept defendant's argument that the scheduling had expired, GHB was clearly listed in Schedule I during the period of time in which defendant was found to have possessed and distributed the substances.” [286 F.Supp.2d at 952](#).

Turcotte's claims as to the status and/or scheduling of GHB under the Controlled Substances Act are thus unpersuasive, and we affirm the ruling of the district court on this point.

F. Turcotte's Sundry Procedural Claims

Finally, in addition to the more fully developed claims examined above, Turcotte tacks on five allegations of trial errors and procedural infirmities. These claims are not discussed in the decision below and presumably were not raised before the district court. They are presented in such a cursory and unelaborated fashion that we feel justified in dismissing them outright. In this circuit, unsupported and undeveloped arguments are waived. See [United States v. Toney](#), 27 F.3d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.1994); [United States v. Berkowitz](#), 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir.1991); [Pelfresne v. Village of Williams Bay](#), 917 F.2d 1017, 1023 (7th Cir.1990); [United States v. Williams](#), 877 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir.1989).

[\[15\]](#) Yet even were we to indulge Turcotte and take these claims seriously, they still fail on their own terms. Turcotte's claim that “the use of expert testimony regarding GHB was irrelevant to testimony concerning GBL and BD,” is false. Testimony concerning the health effects of GHB was directly relevant to the second and third clauses of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#), which require controlled substance analogues to have similar actual or purported physiological effects to controlled substances. Thus consideration of GHB's physiological effects was crucial to the jury's determination that GBL, in light of its own physiological effects, is an analogue of GHB.

Turcotte's second claim, that his “sentence was necessarily based upon the sale of all three substances [GHB, BD and GBL],” is little more than a weak reprise of assertions made earlier in the brief concerning disjunctive versus conjunctive readings of [§ 802\(32\)\(A\)](#). For the reasons discussed in that portion of our opinion, *supra*, this claim is directly contradicted by the record and is thus unsupportable.

[16] Turcotte's third claim alleges that the district court improperly allowed two unqualified witnesses to testify as experts regarding the similarity of effects between GHB, GBL and BD. Even if Turcotte had raised this claim previously-which apparently he did not-we still review for abuse of discretion only. [*United States v. Van Dreel*, 155 F.3d 902, 905 \(7th Cir.1998\)](#). Given that both witnesses had advanced scientific degrees (one had a Ph.D. in medical anthropology and one was a medical doctor) and both had published extensively on the effects of GHB and GBL, there is no evidence that the district court abused its discretion in certifying them as expert witnesses.

[17] The fourth claim concerns an episode in which a juror in the case encountered a prosecution witness during a court recess and asked the witness for a mint. Turcotte alleges that the court should have made a more extensive inquiry into the incident or granted Turcotte a mistrial. Turcotte presents absolutely no evidence of any wrongdoing or resulting prejudice connected with this ostensibly chance encounter, and thus he has not even begun to carry his burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion by the district court. See [*United States v. Cassano*, 372 F.3d 868 \(7th Cir.2004\)](#) (district court's decision not to grant a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion).

Finally, Turcotte's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is likewise too sparse and unsupported to gain any traction. Turcotte's unsubstantiated and largely conclusory statements fall far short of carrying his burden of persuasion as to the two elements of the test outlined in [*Strickland v. Washington*, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 \(1984\)](#). See [*United States v. Davenport*, 986 F.2d 1047, 1049 \(7th Cir.1993\)](#) (defendant bears burden of proof and persuasion to establish ineffective assistance of counsel). We also note that, should Turcotte wish to pursue his ineffective assistance claim in earnest, such a claim is best brought in a collateral proceeding under [28 U.S.C. § 2255](#). See [*Massaro v. United States*, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 \(2003\)](#) (Observing that “in most cases a motion brought under [§ 2255](#) is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective-assistance”).

Accordingly, we reject four of these five claims, which seem to be added as afterthoughts to Turcotte's main arguments, and we decline to rule on the fifth (ineffective assistance) at this juncture.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

C.A.7 (Ill.),2005.
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[U.S. v. Turcotte](#), 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.(Ill.),Apr 19, 2005) (NO. 03-2988)

History

Direct History

[1](#) U.S. v. Turcotte, 286 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. Jul 07, 2003) (NO. 00 CR 737)

Affirmed by

=> [2](#) **U.S. v. Turcotte**, 405 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.(Ill.) Apr 19, 2005) (NO. 03-2988), rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied (Jun 14, 2005)

Certiorari Denied by

[3](#) Turcotte v. U.S., 546 U.S. 1089, 126 S.Ct. 1022, 163 L.Ed.2d 853, 74 USLW 3162, 74 USLW 3382, 74 USLW 3390 (U.S. Jan 09, 2006) (NO. 05-336)

Negative Citing References (U.S.A.)

Distinguished by

[4](#) Murray v. Household Bank (SB), N.A., 386 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D.Ill. Sep 12, 2005) (NO. 05 C 1227)
★ ★ **HN: 2 (F.3d)**

Related References

[5](#) U.S. v. Gore, 2001 WL 521392 (N.D.Ill. May 15, 2001) (NO. 00 CR 737)

[6](#) U.S. v. Gore, 2002 WL 1285079 (N.D.Ill. Jun 06, 2002) (NO. 00 CR 737)

[7](#) U.S. v. Turcotte, 333 F.Supp.2d 680 (N.D.Ill. May 26, 2004) (NO. 00 CR 737-2)

Court Documents
Appellate Court Documents (U.S.A.)

U.S. Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings

- [8](#) Turcotte v. United States of America, 2005 WL 2250461 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Sep. 12, 2005) **Petition for a Writ of Certiorari** (NO. 05-336)
- [9](#) Turcotte v. United States of America, 2005 WL 3369168 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Dec. 09, 2005) **Brief for the United States in Opposition** (NO. 05-336)
- [10](#) Turcotte v. United States of America, 2005 WL 3487617 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Dec. 20, 2005) **Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari** (NO. 05-336)

C.A.7 Oral Arguments

- [11](#) United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James R. TURCOTTE, Defendant-Appellant., 2004 WL 5582517 (Oral Argument) (C.A.7 Nov. 1, 2004) **Oral Argument** (NO. 03-2988)

Trial Court Documents (U.S.A.)

N.D.Ill. Trial Pleadings

- [12](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Brian F. GORE James Turcotte., 2000 WL 35572187 (Trial Pleading) (N.D.Ill. Sep. 9, 2000) **Criminal Complaint** (NO. 00CR0737)
- [13](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Brian F. GORE, and James R. Turcotte., 2001 WL 36036958 (Trial Pleading) (N.D.Ill. Jan. 31, 2001) **Count One** (NO. 00CR737)

N.D.Ill. Trial Motions, Memoranda And Affidavits

- [14](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Brian F. GORE and James R. Turcotte, Defendants., 2002 WL 34242651 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Feb. 20, 2002) **Defendant James Turcotte's Motion in Limine to Bar any Use of Colloquial Terms** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [15](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Brian F. GORE and James R. Turcotte, Defendants., 2002 WL 34242652 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Feb. 20, 2002) **Defendant James Turcotte's Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of April Bolling's Death** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [16](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2002 WL 34250806 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. May 22, 2002) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [17](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Brian F. GORE and James R. Turcotte, Defendants., 2002 WL 34242653 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. May 29, 2002) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737)

- [18](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2002 WL 34250807 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov. 8, 2002) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [19](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2002 WL 34250808 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov. 8, 2002) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [20](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2003 WL 25594437 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Apr. 9, 2003) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737)
- [21](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2003 WL 25594438 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jul. 16, 2003) **Notice of Motion** (NO. 00CR737)
- [22](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2003 WL 25594439 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jul. 17, 2003) **Defendant, James R. Turcotte's Response to Government's Memorandum and Motion for Upward Departure** (NO. 00CR737)

N.D.Ill. Jury Instructions

- [23](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2002 WL 34250805 (Jury Instruction) (N.D.Ill. Nov. 22, 2002) **Jury Instructions Given Objected etc. & Jury Verdict Forms** (NO. 00CR737-2)

N.D.Ill. Verdicts, Agreements and Settlements

- [24](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. James R. TURCOTTE., 2002 WL 34242352 (Verdict, Agreement and Settlement) (N.D.Ill. Nov. 22, 2002) **Special Verdict Form One** (NO. 00CR737-2)
- [25](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. James R. TURCOTTE., 2002 WL 34242353 (Verdict, Agreement and Settlement) (N.D.Ill. Nov. 26, 2002) **Special Verdict Form Two** (NO. 00CR737-2)

Dockets (U.S.A.)

U.S.

- [26](#) JAMES R. TURCOTTE v. UNITED STATES, NO. 05-336 (Docket) (U.S. Sep. 15, 2005)

C.A.7

- [27](#) USA v. TURCOTTE, JAMES R., NO. 03-2988 (Docket) (C.A.7 Jul. 24, 2003)

Expert Court Documents (U.S.A.)

U.S. Appellate Petitions, Motions and Filings

- [28](#) Turcotte v. United States of America, 2005 WL 2250461 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Sep. 12, 2005) **Petition for a Writ of Certiorari** (NO. 05-336)

[29](#) Turcotte v. United States of America, 2005 WL 3487617 (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing) (U.S. Dec. 20, 2005) **Reply in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari** (NO. 05-336)

N.D.III. Trial Motions, Memoranda And Affidavits

[30](#) USA, v. GORE, et al., 2002 WL 34250806 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.III. May 22, 2002) **Notice of Filing** (NO. 00CR737-2)

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
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- [1](#) Murray v. Household Bank (SB), N.A., 386 F.Supp.2d 993, 999+ (N.D.Ill. Sep 12, 2005) (NO. 05 C 1227) ★★ **HN: 2 (F.3d)**

Positive Cases (U.S.A.)

★★★ Discussed

- [2](#) U.S. v. Garcia, 439 F.3d 363, 367+ (7th Cir.(Ill.) Feb 28, 2006) (NO. 04-3159) " **HN: 9 (F.3d)**
[3](#) U.S. v. Bamberg, 478 F.3d 934, 939+, 72 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 619, 619+ (8th Cir.(S.D.) Feb 27, 2007) (NO. 06-1489) " **HN: 5,15,16 (F.3d)**

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[5](#) Isby-Israel v. Finnan, 2009 WL 3241317, *1 (7th Cir.(Ind.) Oct 09, 2009) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 09-1283)
[6](#) U.S. v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 590 (7th Cir.(Wis.) Jul 15, 2008) (NO. 06-1519, 06-1801, 06-2333, 06-1757, 06-1963, 06-2594, 06-1777, 06-2268) **HN: 17 (F.3d)**
[7](#) Bodor v. Town of Lowell, 248 Fed.Appx. 752, 754 (7th Cir.(Ind.) Sep 27, 2007) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 07-1978) " **HN: 6 (F.3d)**

- [8](#) Trustees of Chicago Painters and Decorators Pension, Health and Welfare, and Deferred Sav. Plan Trust Funds v. Royal Intern. Drywall and Decorating, Inc., 493 F.3d 782, 789, 154 Lab.Cas. P 10,870, 10870, 41 Employee Benefits Cas. 1026, 1026 (7th Cir.(Ill.) Jul 03, 2007) (NO. 06-2367) **HN: 7 (F.3d)**
- [9](#) U.S. v. Grimes, 219 Fed.Appx. 552, 555 (7th Cir.(Ill.) Mar 14, 2007) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 06-3695) "
- [10](#) U.S. v. West, 207 Fed.Appx. 719, 723 (7th Cir.(Ill.) Dec 08, 2006) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 06-1961)
- [11](#) Campbell v. Johnson, 202 Fed.Appx. 921, 923 (7th Cir.(Wis.) Nov 01, 2006) (Table, text in WESTLAW, NO. 06-1235) "
- [12](#) Santos v. U.S., 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir.(Ind.) Aug 25, 2006) (NO. 04-4221, 05-2316) "
- [13](#) U.S. v. Warren, 454 F.3d 752, 764 (7th Cir.(Ill.) Jul 27, 2006) (NO. 05-2791) "
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- [133](#) Saidi KAFO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent-Appellee., 2005 WL 3817981, *3817981+ (Appellate Brief) (7th Cir. 2005) **Brief and Required Short Appendix of Petitioner-Appellant Saidi Kafo** (NO. 05-3034) ★ ★
- [134](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. John BERGER, Appellant., 2008 WL 5098936, *5098936+ (Appellate Brief) (8th Cir. Nov 17, 2008) **Reply Brief** (NO. 08-1888) ★ ★ **HN: 14 (F.3d)**
- [135](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. John BERGER, Defendant/Appellant., 2008 WL 5008871, *5008871+ (Appellate Brief) (8th Cir. Oct 30, 2008) **Brief of Appellee** (NO. 08-1888-EMSL) ★ **HN: 9,14 (F.3d)**
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- [141](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Victor MADERA aka Russian Vic., 2007 WL 6952313, *6952313+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (D.Conn. Feb 13, 2007) **Government's Reply to Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing** (NO. 304CR316, CFD) " ★ ★ ★ **HN: 1,2 (F.3d)**
- [142](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Mariano MORALES, et al., 2009 WL 1096030, *1096030+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Apr 14, 2009) **Government's Consolidated Response to Defendants' Post-Trial Motions** (NO. 03CR90) " ★ ★ ★
- [143](#) Sharon JANUSZEWSKI, Plaintiff, v. VILLAGE OF OAK LAWN, Fire Chief Thomas Moran, the former Chief of the Village of Oak Lawn Fire Department, Edward Folliad, the current Chief of the Village of Oak Lawn Fire Department, Michael S. Boman, and Robert Wesselhoff, in their individual capacity, Defendants., 2009 WL 3363399, *3363399 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jan 23, 2009) **All Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Rule 72 Objections to Magistrate Ruling of November 12, 2008** (NO. 105CV03820) ★ ★ **HN: 1 (F.3d)**
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- [148](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Anthony C. JENKINS., 2007 WL 6992423, *6992423+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jul 25, 2007) **Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal or in the Alternative for a New Trial** (NO. 06CR780) ★ ★
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- [152](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Roy GLOVER., 2006 WL 5139998, *5139998 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jan 23, 2006) **Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Post-Trial Motion** (NO. 04CR940) ★ ★
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- [154](#) Michael R. KRAMER, et al, Plaintiffs, v. ORLAND PARK NISSAN, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 6083464, *6083464+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Dec 22, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 105CV06143) ★ ★
- [155](#) Nancy R. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. GMAC MORTGAGE COMPANY, d/b/a Ditech.com, Defendant., 2005 WL 3979117, *3979117+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Dec 20, 2005) **Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment** (NO. 05C1229) ★ ★
- [156](#) Linda KILLINGSWORTH, Plaintiff, v. HOUSEHOLD BANK (SB), N.A.; Household Credit Services, Inc.; Household Credit Services (II), Inc.; and Hsbc North America Holdings, Inc., Defendants., 2005 WL 3753948, *3753948+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Dec 15, 2005) **Response to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C5729) ★ ★ **HN: 2 (F.3d)**
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- [158](#) Lillie ASBURY, Plaintiff, v. PEOPLE'S CHOICE HOME LOAN, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 6088157, *6088157 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Dec 06, 2005) **Defendant's Citation of Supplemental Authority in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint** (NO. 105CV05483) ★ ★
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- [160](#) Johnny TREMBLE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN & COUNTRY CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830043, *3830043+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov 30, 2005) **Town & Country Credit Corporation's Reply in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05-C-2625) ★ ★
- [161](#) Barbara BERRY, on behalf of herself and a class, Plaintiff, v. NORTHLAKE CHRYSLER-JEEP, INC.; Lithograph Communications, LLC; and Big Mouth Advertising & Designs, Inc., Defendants., 2005 WL 3830876, *3830876+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov 28, 2005) **Northlake Chrysler's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C5246) ★
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- [163](#) Johnny TREMBLE, Plaintiff, v. TOWN & COUNTRY CREDIT CORPORATION, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830036, *3830036 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov 16, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant Town & Country Credit Corporation's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C2625) ★ ★
- [164](#) Thomas A. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. FINANCE AMERICA, LLC, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830099, *3830099+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov 10, 2005) **Finance America, LLC's Reply In Support of Motion for Partial Judgment On the Pleadings** (NO. 05C1255) ★ ★
- [165](#) Kenneth D. MCCANE, Plaintiff, v. AMERICA'S CREDIT JEWELERS, INC., d/b/a the Diamond Center, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830865, *3830865 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Nov 09, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C5089) ★
- [166](#) Frank N. HERNANDEZ, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITIFINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 3829937, *3829937 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Sep 30, 2005) **Response To Defendant's Motion For Partial Judgment On the Pleadings** (NO. 05C2263) ★ ★
- [167](#) Thomas A. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. FINANCE AMERICA, LLC, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830086, *3830086 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Sep 14, 2005) **Response To Supplemental Authority Submitted By Defendant In Opposition To Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Affirmative Defenses** (NO. 05C1255) ★ ★
- [168](#) Carmencita SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A., successor to Bank One Delaware, N.A., successor to First USA Bank, N.A., also known as Cardmember Services, Defendant., 2005 WL 2870014, *2870014 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Sep 08, 2005) **Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A.'S Sur-Reply to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Reply Brief** (NO. 05CV2644) ★ ★
- [169](#) Carmencita SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A. etc., Defendant., 2005 WL 2611955, *2611955 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Sep 01, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant'S Reply Brief** (NO. 05C2644) ★ ★
- [170](#) Fernando HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. DIRECT MERCHANTS CREDIT CARD BANK, N.A., Defendant., 2005 WL 3830690, *3830690 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Sep 01, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C3297) ★ ★
- [171](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. FUNDS IN THE AMOUNT OF EIGHTY-FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS, (\$85,000), et al, Defendants., 2005 WL 2611308, *2611308+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Aug 25, 2005) **United States' Reply in Support of Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 04C4588) ★ ★ ★

- [172](#) Michael EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants., 2005 WL 2869698, *2869698+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Aug 20, 2005) **Memorandum in Support of the Police Officer Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment** (NO. 04C3570) ★★
- [173](#) Carmencita SIMPSON, Plaintiff, v. CHASE BANK USA, N.A. successor to Bank One Delaware, N.A., successor to First Usa Bank, N.A., also known as Cardmember Services, Defendants., 2005 WL 2611936, *2611936 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Aug 08, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant'S Motion to Dismiss OR for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C2644) ★★
- [174](#) Thomas A. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830071, *3830071+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. Jul 14, 2005) **Defendant Cross Country Bank's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C1252) ★★
- [175](#) Thomas A. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830070, *3830070 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. May 11, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C1252) ★★
- [176](#) Deborah V. JACKSON, Plaintiff, v. NEXTEL COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 3710008, *3710008 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C4802) ★★
- [177](#) Willie JACKSON; Barbara Jackson; Plaintiffs, v. AMERIQUEST MORTGAGE COMPANY, Amc Mortgage Services, Inc., and John Does 1-100, Defendants., 2005 WL 3793917, *3793917+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C5614) ★★
- [178](#) Lois KUDLICKI, Plaintiff, v. FARRAGUT FINANCIAL CORPORATION, Defendant., 2005 WL 3829974, *3829974 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 05C2459) ★
- [179](#) Thomas A. MURRAY, Deborah Jackson, and Jason Wanek, Plaintiffs, v. Cingular WIRELESS II, LLC, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830126, *3830126 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment On the Pleadings** (NO. 05C1334) ★★
- [180](#) Scott A. MURRAY, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CENTURION BANK and American Express Travel Related Services, Inc., Defendants., 2005 WL 3830163, *3830163 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Reply Brief** (NO. 05C3118) ★★
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- [183](#) Jason WANEK, Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK MORTGAGE COMPANY, LLC, Defendant., 2005 WL 3830819, *3830819 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ill. 2005) **Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 05C4774) ★★
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- [185](#) TRELLEBORG CORPORATION PLAN NO. 511 and Unum Life Insurance Company of America, as the Erisa Claims Administrator, Plaintiffs, v. KATHLEEN HEATH, Trelleborg Corporation, and Trelleborg Ysh, Inc., Defendants., 2007 WL 2982178, *2982178 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (S.D.Ill. Aug 13, 2007) **Plaintiffs' Response to Heath's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint** (NO. 07-326-DRH) ★ ★
- [186](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. James V. VEST, Defendant., 2006 WL 3069200, *3069200 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (S.D.Ill. Aug 07, 2006) **Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 06-CR-30011-DRH) ★ ★ **HN: 11 (F.3d)**
- [187](#) Jana SHELLMAN on behalf of herself and a class, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE BANK and Capital One Services, Inc., Defendants., 2006 WL 589340, *589340 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Jan 09, 2006) **Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 105-CV-00368) ★ ★
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- [189](#) Darrell BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, doing business as Champion Mortgage, Defendant., 2005 WL 4130299, *4130299 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Dec 15, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 205-CV-330) ★ ★
- [190](#) Jana SHELLMAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 4125536, *4125536 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 18, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Amended Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 105-CV-0234) ★ ★
- [191](#) Boris STAVROFF, Plaintiff, v. GURLEY LEEP DODGE, INC., doing business as Dodge City; and Jim Mudd Advertising Agency, Inc., d/b/a The Mudd Group, Defendants., 2005 WL 4130297, *4130297+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 17, 2005) **Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Amended Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 305-CV-229AS) ★
- [192](#) Perrie BONNER and Darrell Bruce, Plaintiffs, v. HOME 123 CORPORATION and New Century Mortgage Corporation, Defendants., 2005 WL 4130281, *4130281 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 16, 2005) **Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Memorandum in Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings*** (NO. 205-CV-00146) ★ ★
- [193](#) Boris STAVROFF, Plaintiff, v. GURLEY LEEP DODGE, INC., doing business as Dodge City; and Jim Mudd Advertising Agency, Inc., d/b/a The Mudd Group, Defendants., 2005 WL 4130296, *4130296 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 10, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Amended Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 305-CV-00229) ★ ★
- [194](#) Darrell BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. GRIEGER'S MOTOR SALES INC., and Capital One Auto Finance, Inc., Defendants., 2005 WL 4125532, *4125532+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 07, 2005) **Joint Reply in Support of Defendants' Joint Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and for A Stay Pending the Resolution of the 12(C) Motion** (NO. 205CV230RL) ★ ★
- [195](#) Darrell BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant., 2005 WL 4125545, *4125545 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Nov 04, 2005) **Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Reply in Support of its Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 205-CV-00243) ★ ★
- [196](#) Darrell BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. GRIEGER'S MOTOR SALES INC., and Capital One Auto Finance,

- Inc., Defendants., 2005 WL 4125531, *4125531 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Oct 20, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Joint Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and for A Stay Pending the Resolution of the 12(c)** (NO. 205-CV-00230) ★ ★
- [197](#) Darrell BRUCE, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Defendant., 2005 WL 4125544, *4125544 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Oct 12, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 205-CV-00243) ★ ★
- [198](#) Jana SHELLMAN, Plaintiff, v. COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., Defendant., 2005 WL 2885711, *2885711+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Oct 07, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 105-CV-0234) ★ ★
- [199](#) Daniece BONNER, Plaintiff, v. GLOBE LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant., 2005 WL 2912368, *2912368 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Oct 06, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss** (NO. 205-CV-00285) ★ ★
- [200](#) Perrie BONNER, Plaintiff, v. H&R BLOCK MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Defendant., 2005 WL 4130284, *4130284+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Sep 29, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 205-CV-00162) ★ ★
- [201](#) Boris STAVROFF, Plaintiff, v. GURLEY LEEP DODGE, INC., doing business as Dodge City, Defendant., 2005 WL 4130293, *4130293+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Sep 23, 2005) **Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 305-CV-229AS) ★ ★
- [202](#) Boris STAVROFF, Plaintiff, v. GURLEY LEEP DODGE, INC., doing business as Dodge City, Defendant., 2005 WL 4130292, *4130292+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (N.D.Ind. Sep 16, 2005) **Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings** (NO. 305-CV-229) ★ ★
- [203](#) Cassandra WELCH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, Defendant., 2009 WL 3781845, *3781845 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (S.D.Ind. May 27, 2009) **Response to Plaintiffs' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's March 16, 2009 Discovery Order** (NO. 106-CV-0641-RLY-JMS) ★ ★
- [204](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. James Kenneth HANEY, Suffolk Asphalt Supply, Inc. William Louis Fehr, Jr. All-County Paving Corp. Prima Asphalt Concrete, Inc. William Louis Fehr, Sr. Pav-Co Asphalt, Inc. Frank Gerald Scambria, and Sundial Asphalt Co., Inc., Defendants., 2006 WL 5043009, *5043009 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (E.D.N.Y. Oct 30, 2006) **Notice of Motion** (NO. 05CR924, ADS) ★ ★
- [205](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Bashi MUSE, et al., Defendants., 2006 WL 4792921, *4792921 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (S.D.N.Y. Nov 17, 2006) **Defendants' Memorandum of Law** (NO. 06600, DLC) ★ ★
- [206](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Akhil BANSAL., 2005 WL 5714656, *5714656 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (E.D.Pa. 2005) **Government's Second Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum** (NO. 05-193-02) ★ ★
- [207](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Mahamoud Omar JAMA et al., Defendants., 2007 WL 4251652, *4251652 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (W.D.Wash. Feb 06, 2007) **Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss Indictment on Due Process Grounds and Supporting Memorandum** (NO. CR06-255JLR) ★ ★
- [208](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Jefferson N. CALIMLIM, and Elnora M. Calimlim, Jeferson M. Calimlim, Defendants., 2006 WL 5149923, *5149923+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (E.D.Wis. Aug 30, 2006) **United States' Response to Defendants' Rule 29 and Rule**

12(b)(3)(B) Motions (NO. 04-CR-248, RTR) ★ ★

- [209](#) SUPERL SEQUOIA LIMITED, Plaintiff, v. THE C.W. CARLSON COMPANY, INC. a/k/a the Carlson Company, Inc., Defendant., 2008 WL 2775549, *2775549 (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (W.D.Wis. Jun 06, 2008) **Plaintiff Superl Sequoia Limited's Brief in Opposition to the Carlson Company, Inc.'s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Breach of Contract and Warranty Counterclaims** (NO. 307CV00640) ★ ★
- [210](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Doli Syarief PULUNGAN, Defendant., 2008 WL 5690244, *5690244+ (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (W.D.Wis. Apr 21, 2008) **Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One** (NO. 07-CR-144-C) ★ ★ ★

Trial Filings

- [211](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Lien DAM., 2007 WL 3298961, *3298961 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Aug 03, 2007) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-585) ★ ★
- [212](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Phuoc DUONG., 2007 WL 3216706, *3216706 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Jun 14, 2007) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 07-103) ★ ★
- [213](#) USA, v. DAM et al., 2007 WL 5032850, *5032850 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. May 16, 2007) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-585) ★ ★ **HN: 4 (F.3d)**
- [214](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Timothy DO., 2007 WL 3310831, *3310831 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Apr 12, 2007) **Government's Revised Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 07-26) ★ ★
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- [217](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Lam TA., 2007 WL 3299175, *3299175 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Jan 19, 2007) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-584) ★ ★
- [218](#) USA, v. LE, et al., 2007 WL 5032984, *5032984 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. 2007) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 07-245) ★ ★ **HN: 4 (F.3d)**
- [219](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Hung Minh LE Trung Minh Le Thanh Le., 2006 WL 4973038, *4973038 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Dec 13, 2006) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-426) ★ ★
- [220](#) USA, v. NGUYEN et al., 2006 WL 5508918, *5508918 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Nov 14, 2006) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-425) ★ ★ **HN: 4 (F.3d)**
- [221](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Adam Joshua CARNAHAN., 2006 WL 4973004, *4973004 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Nov 02, 2006) **Government's Guilty Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-587) ★
- [222](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Thanh NGUYEN., 2006 WL 4973035, *4973035 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Oct 30, 2006) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-425) ★ ★
- [223](#) USA, v. NGUYEN et al., 2006 WL 5508917, *5508917 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. Oct 30, 2006) **Government's Change of Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-425) ★ ★ **HN: 4 (F.3d)**
- [224](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. Ankur PATEL., 2006 WL 4973110, *4973110+ (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. 2006) **Government's Guilty Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-563) ★ ★
- [225](#) USA, v. PATEL et al., 2006 WL 5508923, *5508923 (Trial Filing) (E.D.Pa. 2006) **Government's Guilty Plea Memorandum** (NO. 06-563) ★ ★ **HN: 4 (F.3d)**

Jury Instructions

- [226](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Billy L. HICKS, Jr., Defendant., 2009 WL 1883127, *1883127 (Jury Instruction) (S.D.Ind. Mar 09, 2009) **Government's Tendered Jury Instructions** (NO. 108-CR-00045-WTL-KPF) ★ ★ **HN: 5 (F.3d)**
- [227](#) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. Wade BAMBERG, Defendant., 2005 WL 5886256, *5886256+ (Jury Instruction) (D.S.D. Oct 18, 2005) **Defendant's Proposed Jury Instructions, Nos. 1-12** (NO. CR05-40012) ★